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ROBERT OPPENHEIMER died in Princeton, New 
Jersey on February 18, 1967, at the age of sixty- 
two. He was the leading American theoretical 
physicist of his generation, the founder of the 
most important school of theoretical physics, and 
one of the leading intellectuals of our day. 
Robert Oppenheimer, whose full name was J 
Robert Oppenheimer, was born in New York 
City on April 22, 1904. His father, Julius 
Oppenheimer, was a very successful member of a 
firm of textile importers which had been started 
by his uncle and which his father had joined at 
an early age after immigrating from Germany. 
His mother, Ella Friedman Oppenheimer, shared 
her husband's interest in the Ethical Culture 
Society and had many interests of her own. She 
was an accomplished painter. Robert grew up in 
an atmosphere of culture and affluence in which 
his intellectual curiosity was stimulated and en- 
couraged. At a very early age he became in- 
terested in minerals and by age eleven was a 
member of the New York Mineralogical Club, 
largely on the basis of an erudite correspondence 
which he carried on with some of the members. 
Robert attended the Ethical Culture School in 
New York where he apparently kept much to 
himself, having little interaction with other 
students. He had great facility with languages 
and before he graduated he had mastered several 
languages as well as almost everything else the 
school had to offer. His family had long before 
recognized him as a prodigy and fed his voracious 
appetite for learning with books about his latest 
interests. His interests moved toward chemistry 
and he had the good fortune to have a stimulating 
teacher, Augustus Klock. 
During the summers the family would move to 
a house in Bay Shore on the south shore of Long 
1 Dr. Bacher's memoir of Robert Oppenheimer, dis- 
tinguished member of the American Philosophical Society, 
prepared by request for the Society's Year Book, is of 
such fullness and historical value that it is presented in- 
stead in the Proceedings for the benefit of a wider 
circle of readers. 
Island. His father presented him with a sailboat 
which Robert named Trimethy after a chemical 
compound that interested him. He and his younger 
brother Frank, born in 1912, sailed the Great 
South Bay endlessly. He became an accomplished 
sailor and kept an interest in sailing for the rest 
of his life. 
In spite of outdoor summers, Robert was frail 
and was often ill, especially during the winters. 
He completed his work at Ethical Culture School 
early in 1921 and then took some advanced chemis- 
try before the close of the spring term and gradua- 
tion. After that his family went to Europe where 
Robert and Frank had a fine time exploring and 
seeing the sights. Robert became ill apparently 
with dysentery and was brought home to recover 
and recuperate. By fall he had not acquired suf- 
ficient strength to enter Harvard where he had 
been admitted. Instead he stayed in New York 
and then his father persuaded one of his former 
instructors at Ethical Culture School to go west 
with him to a ranch in the upper Pecos area of 
the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in New Mexico. 
Katherine Page, who owned and operated this 
ranch, encouraged Robert's interest in the out- 
doors and riding. He rapidly gained strength and, 
after spending the summer again at Bay Shore, 
headed for Harvard with enthusiasm. 
To quote his own words he "almost came alive" 
at Harvard. He was able to start with advanced 
standing and each year audited more courses 
(including examinations) than he took regularly. 
He soon realized that his interests were in physics 
and was attracted to Percy Bridgman, who gave 
him help and good advice. Robert Oppenheimer 
graduated summa cum laude in three years. 
The next year he went to Cambridge Uni- 
versity where he tried his hand at some experi- 
ments. He was greatly attracted by visiting 
lecturers who were reporting on the new work 
in quantum mechanics, especially Max Born. As 
a result, he transferred to Gottingen and im- 
mediately found himself in the midst of an extra- 
ordinary group of professors, postdoctoral fellows 
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and students who were deep in the application of 
the new quantum mechanics. Robert worked 
with great intensity and with such success that in 
the spring of 1927 after less than two years he 
was awarded the Ph.D degree. 
For the following year he had a National Re- 
search Council fellowship at Harvard and the 
California Institute of Technology. By this time 
he had made some major contributions in the 
application of the new quantum mechanics and was 
widely sought after for a university position. He 
decided that he needed another year to study be- 
fore he started to teach and he was awarded an 
International Education Board fellowship to study 
in Europe at Leiden and at Zurich. Ehrenfest 
and especially Pauli made deep impressions on 
him. 
At this point he expressed a strong desire to go 
home. He had decided on an unusual arrangement 
of a double appointment as assistant professor at 
Caltech and at the University of California at 
Berkeley. For several years he taught through 
the fall term at Berkeley, then after Christmas 
went to Pasadena for the spring. His teaching was 
not an immediate success. He felt that he was 
going much too slowly; yet his students had real 
difficulty keeping up the pace. In addition, he 
spoke very softly with a fair amount of mumbling. 
This once caused Ehrenfest, a stickler for clear 
exposition, to call repeatedly in a Caltech seminar 
"Louder, please, dear Oppenheimer." When 
Robert's voice quickly dropped after the third call 
he banged his desk. Robert stopped and said 
"But this room is so big." Ehrenfest shouted 
"You always adjust your voice so we can't hear. 
I couldn't hear you in a telephone booth." Before 
very many years Robert Oppenheimer became an 
excellent lecturer and many of his general lectures 
are known for their lucid expositions of funda- 
mental ideas in physics. 
Students were attracted to Robert Oppenheimer 
and he soon established a group of students and 
postdoctoral fellows with whom he worked. Their 
relation with him was close and personal. When 
he went to Pasadena in the spring most of his 
group followed along. Some too, followed him to 
his ranch in the upper Pecos, a beautiful spot not 
far from where he had stayed before and which he 
had acquired before going to Europe in 1928. He 
called it "Perro Caliente," Hot Dog, reputedly 
the exclamation he made when he first saw it. 
Through the thirties his summers were almost 
always spent there in New Mexico. He used it 
as a base from which he and his brother Frank 
took long rides through the mountains and high 
desert for days at a time. It was a vigorous life 
and doubtless helped to develop the extraordinary 
stamina which he showed later. Many visitors, 
especially his students and physicist friends, visited 
there and had lively discussions on new work in 
quantum theory. 
Robert Oppenheimer gradually shortened his 
visits to Caltech and made Berkeley his main base. 
Just before World War II he lived almost entirely 
in Berkeley except for occasional visits and a few 
weeks in the early summer in Pasadena. He had 
many friends in Pasadena and always kept a close 
interest in the work in cosmic rays and high- 
energy radiation, since it was so close to his long- 
time theoretical interests. During the years be- 
fore the war, Robert Oppenheimer's group in 
theoretical physics was the strongest one in the 
country.2 In addition to excellent graduate 
students, numerous postdoctoral fellows, including 
Schwinger, Serber, and many others, worked with 
him. It was a vigorous and productive group 
and former members now staff many of the most 
distinguished university faculties in theoretical 
physics. 
In 1940 Robert Oppenheimer married Katherine 
Puening Harrison, whom he had met in Pasadena. 
In 1941 they had their first child, Peter, in 
Pasadena. About this time Robert bought a house 
at 1 Eagle Hill which commanded a fine view over 
San Francisco Bay and which provided a delight- 
ful spot to entertain his students and co-workers. 
The discovery of nuclear fission in 1939 tied 
into many current activities in the Radiation Labo- 
ratory at Berkeley, where neptunium and later plu- 
tonium were discovered not long after. The fall of 
France and the battle of Britain began to displace 
the overpowering concern for research in Berkeley. 
In late 1940 and early 1941, many of Robert's 
colleagues left to work on weapons research for 
a war in which the United States was not yet 
involved but might soon be. 
Some work continued on the fission project 
which was financed on a relatively small scale by 
the government hrough a committee. In early 
1942 work on the possibility of producing a nuclear 
chain reaction was brought together at the Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago 
2 An account of Robert Oppenheimer's work in 
theoretical physics by Hans Bethe may be found in 
Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 
14 (1968): p. 391. 
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and given greater support. The director, Arthur 
Compton, asked Robert Oppenheimer to get a 
theoretical group together in the summer of 1942 
to look into the possibility of whether, if reason- 
ably pure fissionable material were available, an 
explosive could be made, and if so how. Work 
on the electromagnetic separation process was 
being undertaken at the Radiation Laboratory in 
Berkeley under the driving leadership of Ernest 
Lawrence, who asked Robert to help with some 
of the separation magnet design problems. It 
seemed almost an impossible job to get fissionable 
material in quantity by this method but it was 
certainly possible in principle. Other methods 
had even more fundamental difficulties. 
By mid-1942 the work by Fermi and others at 
Chicago on the possibility of a nuclear chain reac- 
tion looked very promising. The first self-sustain- 
ing nuclear chain reaction was achieved on Decem- 
ber 2, 1942. Although the problems seemed almost 
insurmountable, this opened the real possibility 
that plutonium might be produced in quantity as 
an alternative to uranium 235 as a fissionable 
material. 
The advances of the uranium project, especially 
Fermi's work, supplemented by urging from the 
British, prompted Vannevar Bush and James Con- 
ant who held the top responsibility to seek much 
broader support from President Roosevelt. If any- 
thing were to be accomplished here, huge industrial 
plants would be needed and these must be planned 
immediately and started as soon as possible even 
before many technical problems were solved. A 
new project, the Manhattan Project, was created 
with the highest priorities and Colonel Leslie 
Groves was put in charge. Actually the organiza- 
tion started earlier but was formally set up in 
September, 1942, just after Groves was made 
brigadier general. 
Groves was a very fortunate choice to head this 
project. He was energetic and forceful but very 
blunt. He was a good judge of people, knew 
when to trust advice and when he did, he backed 
that advice without wavering. Heads of the pro- 
jects aimed at U-235 and plutonium production 
were already selected: Lawrence for the electro- 
magnetic method, Urey for the diffusion method, 
and Compton for the nuclear reactors or piles as 
they were then called. While Groves was put in 
charge of production, it was soon agreed that he 
should take total responsibility including research 
and development with a Military Policy Committee 
including Bush and Conant. Not long thereafter, 
Groves appointed Conant and Tolman as his 
scientific advisers. Tolman, especially, followed 
the project closely and provided a link to the 
scientific ommunity. 
Groves consulted Oppenheimer about the status 
of the theoretical studies of the assembly of suf- 
ficient fissionable material to make a bomb and 
what would be the expected effects of the resulting 
explosion. Oppenheimer pointed out many of the 
basic unknowns, among them being the wide 
limits that must be placed on the amount of valu- 
able material needed. He recommended to Groves 
that proper studies could only be conducted if a 
separate laboratory were established for this pur- 
pose and if there were free exchange among those 
working on the overall problem. Groves was a 
strong believer in compartmentalization for this 
highly secret project. He liked the idea of separat- 
ing the bomb work from the rest of the project 
but recoiled at the idea of no compartmentaliza- 
tion within such a laboratory. Groves also had 
to find a director for such a laboratory. He ap- 
parently discussed this at length with Bush and 
Conant and with the heads of the other projects. 
There were not many suitable candidates and such 
as there were had major responsibilities else- 
where. Groves had been greatly impressed by 
Oppenheimer and decided that if a separate labora- 
tory were to be established, he would make a good 
director. This decision certainly took a great deal 
of insight and nerve because Robert did not have 
any administrative experience and had never 
directed anything. It was a brilliant choice. 
In the fall, steps were taken to locate the labora- 
tory. A site in southern California was examined 
but Groves thought it was insufficiently isolated. 
New Mexico was suggested and Groves sent 
members of his staff to investigate. Finally on a 
trip with Oppenheimer, Edwin McMillan, and 
some of his staff, Groves drove over the Jemez 
Mountains to the site of the Los Alamos Ranch 
School high on a mesa west of the Rio Grande 
and close to the Jemez Mountains. This site was 
sufficiently isolated for Groves and appealed to 
Oppenheimer, who knew the country well. Water 
was limited but Groves thought a supply could be 
found, and steps were taken to acquire a large site. 
With the assistance of John Manley, who had 
been helping Oppenheimer with the project almost 
ever since Compton had given him his first re- 
sponsibility in this area, and of Edwin McMillan, 
he started to draw up requirements for a labora- 
tory that would be adequate for about one hundred 
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scientists and engineers. Equipment was bor- 
rowed from several universities in order to get a 
working laboratory as quickly as possible. Op- 
penheimer spent a great deal of his time recruiting. 
He had been persuaded by Groves that this under- 
taking must be a military project with the director 
an officer. Robert was dismayed to find that 
those who had experience in war projects de- 
clared vigorously that this would not work. After 
a good deal of discussion it was agreed that the 
laboratory would start out as a civilian laboratory 
reporting to Groves but would probably become 
a military laboratory when significant amounts of 
fissionable material began to arrive. This was 
formalized in a letter signed by Groves and 
Conant. 
Fortunately several small groups that had been 
working on problems associated with the Metal- 
lurgical Laboratory in Chicago could be closed 
down now, and, if the personnel involved could 
be persuaded, might form a nucleus of a staff for 
Los Alamos. Robert was very persuasive. The 
largest number came from Princeton where Robert 
Wilson with a small group had been working on 
an alternative electromagnetic method of isotope 
separation. Others came from Berkeley, Illinois, 
Cornell, Minnesota, Purdue, Chicago, and Wis- 
consin. Robert attracted a very strong theoretical 
group centered around those who had worked 
with him during the summer of 1942, and in- 
cluding Bethe, Teller, Weisskoff, Konopinski, 
Serber, Placzek, Marshak, Christy, and Feynman. 
It was an outstanding roup. 
The building went up with incredible speed, 
being made for the most part out of green lumber 
from trees cut down nearby. By mid-March of 
1943 staff members started arriving and were 
forced to live off-site. By early April the labora- 
tory was sufficiently complete that a conference to 
pull together all the known information pertinent 
to the bomb project was scheduled for April 15. 
The conferees were almost entirely committed 
project members but there were a few others, 
including Fermi, without whom any conference 
on chain reactions would not have been complete, 
and Rabi and Bacher from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Radiation Laboratory 
(Radar) who had been advising Oppenheimer 
since the end of 1942 on problems which a new 
laboratory might encounter. Subsequently a dozen 
or more members of the MIT laboratory came 
to Los Alamos, bringing with them technology 
which had been developed there and which might 
be helpful at Los Alamos. Members of other war 
laboratories also came to Los Alamos and the 
assembled group represented wide experience in 
new technical developments. 
The conference lasted about ten days. A 
primer on the subject had been prepared and all 
of the known information was discussed at length. 
The preferred method of assembling a super- 
critical mass with adequate speed was discussed 
by Serber and others. The idea was to shoot a 
piece of U-235 into another piece which was sur- 
rounded with neutron reflector, or tamper as it 
was called, at such speed that no neutron reaction 
would be initiated until the entire mass was highly 
supercritical. Other methods of assembly were 
discussed, especially an implosion method which 
Neddermeyer discussed. The ordnance people 
were disturbed at the problems that this would 
raise and had major doubts that a sufficiently 
symmetrical implosion could be achieved. The 
gun method looked much easier provided there 
were no really serious surprises among the many 
unknown nuclear properties of U-235 and plu- 
tonium. Through all of this, Robert Oppenheimer 
furnished a very skillful guiding hand. He had 
a tremendous ability to put his finger on critical 
issues and his clarity of summary after a com- 
plicated discussion often made the difference be- 
tween moving forward and backward. These were 
qualities which he demonstrated over and over as 
the laboratory director. 
During this same period, Robert Oppenheimer 
was having other difficulties. These were not 
known to his associates but greatly concerned 
General Groves and some of his staff. These were 
clearance problems. During the thirties, Robert 
had many left-wing friends. He had supported the 
Spanish Loyalists through communist channels 
but had drifted away from these connections when 
the flip-flopping communist line made no sense to 
him. Of course, clearance was required of the 
director of the Los Alamos Laboratory and the 
security people must have jumped out of their 
skins at his record. Clearance had been hanging 
fire ever since his first association with the pro- 
ject. No security officer would recommend his 
clearance. Finally General Groves reviewed the 
case carefully and on July 20, 1943, instructed 
the security officers to issue a clearance "irrespec- 
tive of the information which you have concerning 
Mr. Oppenheimer. He is absolutely essential to 
the project." 
The problems that Robert Oppenheimer had in 
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getting the Los Alamos Laboratory started, 
covered every conceivable subject. Living in an 
isolated spot and unable to travel except nearby, 
was an entirely new experience for most labora- 
tory staff people. The problems of getting the 
necessary equipment for the laboratories on very 
short notice and with such a complicated com- 
munciation system with the outside world were 
unbelievable. To solve these and at the same 
time keep a close watch on the essential sub- 
stantive problems of the project was almost too 
much. But Robert did it and at the same time 
kept a close personal touch with most of the work 
going on and the people who were doing it in 
those early days. Robert had great stamina and 
although he lost weight and was much too thin, he 
could outlast almost anyone on the project. 
During that first summer of 1943, Robert often 
expressed privately his real doubts about his 
suitability for the director's job and his concern 
as to whether he could really do it. In a sense he 
was riding the tiger and he felt very heavily 
pressed by the many problems of the project and 
doubtless also by his difficulties with the security 
people. It was perfectly clear to the members of 
his laboratory that he was doing a superb job no 
matter how much they would complain about the 
slowness of getting equipment, the irregularity of 
power or the difficulties in living in this remote 
encampment. 
During the remainder of 1943 and early 1944 
the laboratory made real advances in determining 
the needed nuclear cross sections of fissionable 
and other materials for the bomb. Information 
was also obtained about the number of neutrons 
emitted per fission and some limits, not adequate 
but encouraging, on the time after fission when 
neutrons were emitted. One basic study brought 
forth some very disturbing information. It was 
known that U-238 fissioned spontaneously but the 
rate was sufficiently ow that the gun method of 
assembly of a highly supercritical mass was still 
believed to be adequate. Segre had set up equip- 
ment in a remote location to measure the rates 
of spontaneous fission or at least to put upper 
limits on them. It was a difficult and painstaking 
job but a much needed one. At first he amounts of 
plutonium available were infinitesimal nd these 
were all produced by cyclotron bombardment. 
Material was soon received from the first inter- 
mediate power reactor located at Oak Ridge and 
Segre found indisputably that this material had a 
higher spontaneous fission than previously ob- 
served with uranium or plutonium. Ordinary 
impurities, of course, would not produce such an 
effect and this was believed to be a fundamental 
property of reactor-produced plutonium due to 
neutron capture by Pu-239 to produce Pu-240 in 
the high neutron flux of the reactor. This would 
inevitably be much worse in the material from the 
production reactors under construction at Hanford. 
It was a project crisis. With the expected 
spontaneous fission rates, plutonium for a bomb 
could not be assembled by the gun method. If 
plutonium was to be used, another method must 
be found. The only likely method was the im- 
plosion method which Neddermeyer and a small 
group had been working on since the start of the 
laboratory. Their experiments had shown promise 
but also many difficulties, especially in trying to 
find out what was going on in the very short time 
during the explosion and inward shock. After 
consideration and consultation with the Governing 
Board, Robert decided to make a complete re- 
organization of the laboratory, establishing new 
divisions and putting more emphasis on the study 
of explosives and throwing much of the technical 
experience of the laboratory into the measure- 
ments of sample implosions. No one could be 
sure where this would lead but it was an all-out 
effort. 
With increased effort and the ingenuity shown 
by Neddermeyer, Kerst, Froman, Graves, Rossi, 
Staub, McMillan, Creutz, Critichfield, Barnes, and 
a host of other experimenters, information began 
to accumulate much faster. Explosives improved 
and new ideas for their use were developed by 
Kistiakowsky and the greatly strengthened division 
working with him on this problem. These new 
results provided new information for the theorists 
who were now able to study both the course of 
the implosion and the subsequent nuclear explosion 
which they had studied for the gun method. There 
were many crises during the winter of 1944 and 
the spring of 1945 but the work moved forward 
and showed promise. 
It had been concluded that a full scale nuclear 
test of the implosion weapon might be necessary 
and this was made definite during the winter of 
1944-1945. This project, named Trinity, was 
itself a major undertaking and Kenneth Bain- 
bridge was put in charge of it. He, with the help 
of others, found a site on the Alamagordo bomb- 
ing range and preparations for the test went 
forward both there and at Los Alamos. Now 
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Oppenheimer had even more to worry about and 
to administer. 
The schedule for the test was such that as soon 
as the plutonium for the bomb was ready, every- 
thing else should be ready and the test would be 
held. There was a little delay but not much. In- 
structions from Washington were that no day was 
to be lost and it wasn't. The nuclear assembly 
and final explosives were completed at Alamagordo 
and the shot was scheduled for July 16. This 
was a difficult period for everybody but particu- 
larly for Robert Oppenheimer. There were now 
not only the nuclear problems to worry about but, 
even worse, the possibility that some electrical 
failure would ruin the test. On top of everything 
else it rained in various spots throughout he test 
site during the night of July 15. In spite of this 
it was decided to go ahead. The weather prospects 
for the future were uncertain at this time of year 
and it was clear to some at least that everyone was 
so tired that a postponement would of necessity 
be for several days. 
At the test Robert was thin, worn, and bone- 
tired, but he kept going and functioning very well. 
He was at the same time jubilant that it had 
worked and produced such a big explosion, and 
concerned at the terrible forces now unleashed on 
the world. But these were concerns that he had 
thought about before and he knew that the final 
decisions on use of the bomb must be made by 
President Truman, considering what the alter- 
natives would be for the next stages of the war in 
the Pacific. 
The bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused 
Robert and many others great sadness. Some 
scientists thought that a demonstration would be 
adequate. Robert and many others had doubts 
that this would work. The decision, of course, 
had to be the President's. 
Most of the staff members at Los Alamos were 
on leave from positions elsewhere "for the dura- 
tion" and it was natural that they would soon 
begin to leave. Robert Oppenheimer made plans 
to return to California, actually this time to 
Pasadena, and Norris Bradbury was to succeed 
him as director. Before he left, a public ceremony 
was held to make an award to the laboratory. 
The citation given by General Groves was most 
complimentary and Robert's reply gave indication 
of the thoughts that would guide his actions for 
many years to come: 
The peoples of this world must unite or they will 
perish. This war, which has ravaged so much of the 
earth, has written these words. The atomic bomb 
has spelled them out for all men to understand. 
Other men have spoken them, in other times, of other 
wars, of other weapons. They have not prevailed. 
There are some, misled by a false sense of history, 
who hold that they will not prevail today. It is not 
for us to believe that. By our works we are com- 
mitted, committed to a world united, before this 
common peril, in law and in humanity. 
After leaving Los Alamos, Robert Oppen- 
heimer's scientific interest immediately went back 
to the role of the meson in the origin of nuclear 
forces. He had followed the work of Anderson 
and Neddermeyer before the war and realized that 
the "mesotron" which they had found did not 
interact with nuclei very strongly. Here was a 
basic dilemma. He was immediately in demand 
to lecture far more than he possibly could, on the 
future role of atomic energy, on the nature and 
organization of its development in the United 
States for peaceful purposes, and most of all on 
how the newly developed bomb could serve to 
diminish the likelihood of wars. 
In November, 1945, the American Philosophical 
Society and the National Academy of Sciences 
held in Philadelphia a joint symposium on "Atomic 
Energy and its Implications." Oppenheimer, who 
had been elected a member of the Society in the 
spring of 1945, contributed to the symposium a 
discussion of atomic weapons. No one who heard 
him ever forgot the eloquence and deep emotion 
with which he pictured the destructiveness of the 
bomb or the force of his call for international 
control of this new awesome development. 
The newly established United Nations set up 
an Atomic Energy Commission, and a high-level 
committee was established with Under-Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson as chairman to prepare a 
position for the United States. This was a dif- 
ficult and complicated job, and to get it done a full 
time Board of Consultants was set up with David 
Lilienthal as chairman. Robert Oppenheimer was 
a member of this board and its assignment 
was the subject that he thought most crucial, the 
international control of atomic energy. The Board 
went into continuous session and by mid-March 
had prepared a report which was wide-sweeping 
in its recommendations. The "Report on the In- 
ternational Control of Atomic Energy," usually 
referred to as the Acheson-Lilienthal report, pro- 
posed an international agency which through 
several stages would eventually come into control 
of all atomic developments including the produc- 
tion of raw material, the separation of U-235, the 
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production of plutonium, the production and con- 
trol of weapons, and the ownership of the whole 
project. 
Robert Oppenheimer played a major role in 
working out the nature of the proposals and the 
preparation of the report. The Acheson Com- 
mittee in passing the report on to the Secretary of 
State, said: 
We lay the report before you as the Board has 
submitted itto us, "not as a final plan, but as a place 
to begin, a foundation on which to build." In our 
opinion it furnishes the most constructive analysis of 
the question of international control we have seen 
and a definitely hopeful approach to a solution of 
the entire problem. We recommend itfor your con- 
sideration as representing the framework within 
which the best prospects for both security and 
development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes 
may be found. 
This report received support from many mem- 
bers of the government and others, especially 
scientists who had worked on the Manhattan pro- 
ject. There were some scientists and a good many 
members of the military who viewed the report 
with deep suspicion in spite of the recommenda- 
tions for a series of stages and provision for de- 
tailed inspection. There were some who thought 
such a plan would never be internationally accept- 
able, especially to the Soviets. 
President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch 
as representative on the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission and Richard Tolman became 
his chief scientific adviser. Robert Oppenheimer 
and several others served as scientific advisers, 
but Robert had major concern that the Baruch 
proposal to eliminate the veto would in fact give 
the Soviets an excuse not to agree. No political 
progress was made and it took almost the entire 
summer of 1946 to get the Soviets to agree that 
international control was technically feasible. In 
retrospect it seems clear that the Soviets had no 
intention of agreeing, especially since they were 
well along on the development of their own pro- 
ject with significant help from espionage on both 
the United States and British projects. Robert 
Oppenheimer saw his hope that the bomb would 
provide the impetus for new international agree- 
ment vanishing and he was disheartened by the 
Soviet introduction of the "Iron Curtain," a move 
in the opposite direction. 
During this same time a great debate was going 
on about the management of the atomic-energy 
project in the United States. The first proposal 
had been the May-Johnson bill which seemed 
repressive to many and to be too much involved 
with the military establishment. Many scientists 
actively opposed this bill and Robert was criticized 
by them for his initial support of it. He seemed 
to feel at the end of the war that any plan which 
could go into action would be better than no plan 
and an interval of no action. 
A bill providing for a cilivian commission of 
five full-time members, the McMahon bill, was 
passed in the summer of 1946. This bill had been 
vigorously supported by the Federation of Ameri- 
can Scientists and Robert approved of it but was 
perturbed at the delay. The bill provided for a 
Military Liaison Committee and for a General 
Advisory Committee to advise the Commission 
especially on scientific and technical problems, but 
since these questions were often tied closely to 
long-range policies, the scope was very broad. 
The Commission was appointed in the fall and 
started work in early November. A General 
Advisory Committee (GAC) was appointed by 
the President on recommendation by the Com- 
mission and Robert Oppenheimer became one of 
its members. The Commission formally took over 
the management of the Manhattan Project on 
January 1, 1947, and the GAC held its first meet- 
ing almost immediately. 
Robert Oppenheimer was elected chairman of 
the Committee and continued in this position until 
the expiration of his term in 1952. The Com- 
mission was faced with long hearings on the con- 
firmation of its members and with serious problems 
in setting up a proper system for the clearance of 
personnel for work which was classified under 
the Atomic Energy Act. There was at that time 
very little recourse for the individual whose 
clearance was denied or revoked by other govern- 
ment agencies, and a new system was developed 
which was generally regarded as being fairest to 
the individual. The General Advisory Committee 
immediately dug into some of the long-range 
plans. There were serious problems in several of 
the laboratories due to the exodus of personnel at 
the end of the war. Nowhere was this more 
serious than at Los Alamos, and it was a major 
and urgent problem for the Commission. The 
GAC clearly recognized the current situation and 
was most helpful in its correction. There were 
so many things that needed doing that some had 
to be postponed and the GAC worked thought- 
fully in relating current activities to long-range 
obj ectives. 
Through all of this Robert Oppenheimer made 
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maj or contributions as a member and chairman 
of the Committee. He had wider experience than 
anyone else in the project as a whole and especially 
with the weapons work. There were others who 
had greater experience in particular areas of the 
project and greater background in technical man- 
agement. Robert's clarity in summation of com- 
plicated situations was most helpful. He could 
summarize and formulate a recommendation that 
took into account varying points of view to the 
satisfaction of all concerned and which definitely 
contributed constructively to the solution of the 
problem. In his conduct of the GAC, he was 
inclined to listen to all views and reserve his 
thoughts to the end. Very often he stayed after 
the meeting for a day to prepare statements of the 
agreed positions with the needed background and 
formulation of the problem. All GAC members 
worked hard and Robert Oppenheimer worked 
harder than anyone else. The contributions of 
the GAC under his chairmanship to the work of 
AEC were major ones in all the scientific and 
technical areas and especially in the formulation 
of plans. An enumeration of the major recom- 
mendations of GAC would be a long document and 
all these were enhanced by the effective personal 
interaction of GAC with the Commission, especi- 
ally effective with Robert as chairman. 
During this same period Robert served on 
committees to advise the State Departinent on 
international questions involving atomic energy 
and the Department of Defense regarding areas 
of interest o the military and especially weapons 
development. He brought the same knowledge 
and insight to these committees and inevitably his 
advice was sought and was respected. It was a 
new life for him. 
In 1947 Oppenheimer, then in residence in 
Berkeley as professor of theoretical physics, was 
invited to become the director of the Institute for 
Advanced Study in Princeton. After many pangs 
over his separation from California, he accepted. 
The post offered an opportunity to start a new 
advanced school of theoretical physics with gen- 
erous financial support, close ties with subjects of 
interest o Robert, and a natural place for a person 
with his broad intellectual scope. In addition, 
it was close to Washington and meant that he 
could continue his ties with government much 
more easily. The Institute had a reputation for 
very strong work in pure mathematics. Its work 
in theoretical physics, while excellent under Ein- 
stein and von Neumann, was largely involved in 
the more mathematical side and there was not 
much activity in the area of fundamental particles 
and the origin of nuclear forces. Robert moved 
quickly to strengthen this area by major staff 
appointments and made the Institute a world 
center for young postdoctoral fellows in theoretical 
physics. 
Early September of 1949 brought the serious 
news to Robert Oppenheimer and others that 
some "positive information" had been obtained 
from the network set up to detect airborne radio- 
activity. He was asked whether he could become 
a member of a panel with Vannevar Bush as 
chairman, to review the findings and assess them. 
In mid-September the panel met with the special- 
ists in a great vaultlike room, and the results were 
clear. Debris from an atomic bomb had been 
picked up. It was not a reactor accident. The 
Soviets had exploded their first atomic bomb. 
There was immediate reaction by the public 
and by the government. The monopoly of the 
United States was ended. It would, of course, be 
some time before the Soviet nuclear capability 
would be significant, but this was a new situation. 
It called for reexamination of the entire atomic 
energy program and for reassessment of inter- 
national relations and obj ectives. One area in 
weapon development was singled out for special 
consideration. This was the thermonuclear wea- 
pon based on the nuclear energy released when 
the heavy isotopes of hydrogen, naturally occurring 
deuterium and artificially produced tritium, react 
at very high temperature to produce helium. 
The thermonuclear or H-bomb had been 
worked on almost since the beginning of bomb 
work. It had been a subj ect for some of the ex- 
perimental work done outside the Metallurgical 
Laboratory in 1942 and it had been a principal 
subj ect for the theoretical study conducted under 
Robert Oppenheimer's guidance in Berkeley in 
the summer of 1942. During the war a group 
worked at this project at Los Alamos, difficult as 
this was under the pressure of the many problems 
connected with the fission bomb. Work continued 
on this project after the war but the reduced man- 
power of the laboratory and later the promising 
developments of fission weapon development ook 
precedence. One of the principal difficulties was 
that the early ideas for a "Super" which would 
couple deuterium into a fission bomb looked less 
promising as they were examined in greater de- 
tail and seemed to require significant quantities 
of tritium. Tritium had to be produced in nuclear 
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reactors and its production would diminish the 
production of plutonium. 
This question of the H-bomb or Super came 
before the General Advisory Committee in Octo- 
ber, 1949. The discussion has been recounted 
many times and there were many different shades 
of opinion perhaps not all appreciated fully today. 
Even the question being decided-whether a 
research program, a crash development program, 
or any program on the H-bomb-is subj ect to 
debate in the public print. However it was, the 
GAC recommended against a vigorous program to 
develop the H-bomb. A part of their recom- 
mendation was later published, quoted in his 
hearings by Robert Oppenheimer as follows: 
We all hope that by one means or another, the 
development of these weapons can be avoided. We 
are reluctant to see the United States take the initia- 
tive in precipitating this development. We are all 
agreed that it would be wrong at the present moment 
to commit ourselves to an all-out effort owards its 
development. 
To what extent the unpromising state of thermo- 
nuclear work at that time contributed is not clear. 
Also to what extent the imitative nature of the 
Soviet program up to that time influenced the 
recommendation is also not clear. Subsequent 
development made it clear that in this area the 
Soviets had brilliant men at work. 
The recommendation of the GAC, to which 
there was no dissent, was passed on to the Com- 
mission. After long discussion, the Commission 
reported to President Truman that there was 
unanimous agreement among the commissioners 
that this decision, which involved basic national 
policy on defense posture and international rela- 
tions, must be made by him. There was not an 
agreed recommendation by the commissioners on 
what this decision should be. Their divergent 
individual views were appended or submitted later. 
The GAC report was also appended. The com- 
missioners' report was made in early November 
and the President pondered his decision with 
further advice from the special committee of the 
National Security Council set up to consider the 
production of fissionable material and nuclear 
weapons. There was vigorous opposition to the 
GAC recommendation from some scientists, from 
the military establishment, and from some mem- 
bers of the Joint Congressional Committee on 
Atomic Energy. In late January, the President 
instructed the AEC to go ahead with the develop- 
ment of an H-bomb and an announcement was 
made. The issues became very confused in the 
public debate in major part because sufficient in- 
formation for intelligent discussion by ordinary 
citizens was not available. 
There has been a great deal of argument about 
immediately subsequent events. The records 
available seem to show that the Commission and 
the GAC tried to get forward as fast as they could 
with what appeared to be an unpromising job. 
There were recriminations from the military and 
others that the work was not being pushed hard 
enough. 
In June of 1951 a meeting was called by Robert 
Oppenheimer in Princeton to discuss some radical 
new suggestions which were presented by Edward 
Teller and for which he and Ulam, with stimula- 
tion from von Neumann, were principally re- 
sponsible. The ideas met with a very favorable 
reception and it was generally agreed that these 
were the best ideas yet to be brought into the ther- 
monuclear development. Everyone at this meeting 
felt that these ideas should be pursued. They were 
sufficiently different from the original line of the 
Super that apparently the question was subse- 
quently raised whether following them was really 
pursuing the President's directive. Nevertheless 
they were pursued and a large thermonuclear 
device based on the development of these ideas 
was exploded in the South Pacific in late 1952. 
Robert Oppenheimer's term as a member of the 
General Advisory Committee expired in 1952 
and he had requested that he not be considered 
for reappointment, believing that some rotation 
was desirable. It subsequently became known that 
he had offered to submit his resignation from the 
GAC earlier following the President's decision. 
He had, however, been persuaded by Chairman 
Gordon Dean to stay on at least until the end of 
his appointment. 
From 1951 to 1953 there were several studies 
sponsored by the Department of Defense and 
carried out by various universities. These grew 
out of our participation in the Korean War and 
concerns expressed over our vulnerability to air 
attack. Some of these studies considered the 
possibilities of developing atomic weapons for 
other than strategic bombing use. The tactical use 
of nuclear weapons was considered at some length 
in Project Vista at Caltech. This subject did not 
find support among those who wished to rely 
on strategic bombing. The problems of air de- 
fense were considered at Project Charles at MIT. 
F3Robert Oppenheimer participated in these and 
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other studies as a consultant and as usual with his 
clarity of mind and background in the subject 
made major contributions. 
For several years the McCarthy era in Washing- 
ton had been building up. Several scientists had 
been called before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, among them Edward Con- 
don and Frank Oppenheimer. The climate was 
quite intolerant of even relatively weak left-wing 
connections. It was a time of fear for many who 
had had such connections in the thirties. Both 
Frank and Robert Oppenheimer were called to 
testify in 1949 and had been mentioned in other 
hearings and in various newspaper stories. Robert 
was asked about people whom he had known and 
about various incidents that had worried security 
officers in 1943. Frank was accused of being a 
member of the Communist party. He first denied 
this but, testifying under oath before the com- 
mittee, both he and his wife admitted having been 
members. This admission made headlines all over 
the country especially because of Robert's close 
ties to the government. 
In a climate of continued accusations of com- 
munists and fellow travelers in government, ques- 
tions began to be raised in public about Robert 
Oppenheimer's associations before the war. There 
were members of the military establishment, both 
officers and civilians, who put this record together 
with the recommendations about the H-bomb and 
the development of tactical nuclear weapons which 
they found strongly distasteful and came out with 
strong suspicion of Robert Oppenheimer's motives. 
Other scientists had been just as much responsible 
for the recommendations made, but they were not 
otherwise as vulnerable. In November, 1953, 
William Borden, a former member of the staff of 
the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic 
Energy addressed a letter to J. Edgar Hoover 
which contained the following charge and elabo- 
rated at length upon it: 
The purpose of this letter is to state my own 
exhaustively considered opinion based upon years of 
study of the available classified evidence, that more 
probably than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an 
agent of the Soviet Union. 
These charges produced immediate and vigorous 
action in the government. First there was further 
FBI investigation and presumably a report. The 
subject was so inflammatory and the charges so 
categorical that it soon came to President Eisen- 
hower's urgent attention. Within a month of 
Borden's letter, the President directed that a 
"blank wall" be placed between Robert Oppen- 
heimer and any information of a sensitive or classi- 
fied nature. 
When Robert Oppenheimer had retired from 
the GAC his voluminous and highly classified files 
in Princeton had been returned to Washington. 
He still was a consultant to AEC, although not 
very active and his services had been sought by 
the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Office of 
Defense Mobilization. The President's order, of 
course, stopped these relations, but was in itself 
an interim measure. 
Further action soon came from AEC in the 
form of a set of charges in a letter from AEC 
General Manager Kenneth Nichols. This letter 
questioned whether Robert Oppenheimer's ". 
continued employment on Atomic Energy Com- 
mission work will endanger the common defense 
and security and whether such continued em- 
ployment is clearly consistent with the interests of 
national security." In brief summary the letter 
stated that ". . . these allegations, until disproved, 
raise questions as to your veracity, conduct and 
even your loyalty." These charges were deadly 
serious especially by including Robert's loyalty. 
To many people they were unbelievable. The 
specific harges for the most part involved associa- 
tions with communists or fellow travelers before 
Los Alamos started. Some of these were people 
who were subsequently cleared for work on the 
Manhattan Project. There was the charge that 
Oppenheimer had contributed to communist-front 
organizations before the war. There was the 
charge of negligence in reporting the Chevalier 
incident involving an indirect approach to Robert 
for information regarding the Berkeley project, 
and of the refusal until ordered to give Chevalier's 
name, and then not giving the complete story. 
Chevalier was a Berkeley pre-war friend with left- 
wing sympathies and the Oppenheimers aw him 
occasionally after the war. There was also a 
charge that he had, in the autumn of 1949 and 
subsequently, strongly opposed the development of 
the hydrogen bomb. There were numerous other 
charges but they were all related to these two 
principal areas. The general manager's letter 
stated that in view of these charges Robert Op- 
penheimer's eligibility for access to restricted in- 
formation was suspended pending final determina- 
tion. He was offered the opportunity of appearing 
before an AEC personnel security board if he so 
stated in writing within thirty days. 
Robert Oppenheimer had first been shown a 
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copy of the general manager's letter in draft and 
told that if he wished to terminate his contract as a 
consultant o AEC he could do so and "avoid an 
explicit consideration of the charges." Robert's 
reply the next day to Chairman Lewis Strauss 
said in part: 
Under the circumstances this would mean that I ac- 
cept and concur in the view that I am not fit to serve 
this Government, that I have now served for 12 years. 
This I cannot do. If I were thus unworthy, I could 
hardly have served our country as I have tried, or 
been director of our Institute in Princeton, or have 
spoken, as on more than one occasion I have found 
myself speaking, in the name of science and our 
country. 
Robert Oppenheimer felt that he was forced by 
the nature of the formal charges to request a hear- 
ing. In due course the letter from General 
Manager Nichols was received. In formal reply 
Robert sent back a long letter in early March, 
1954, which was 
. . . in the form of a summary account of relevant 
aspects of my life in more or less chronological order, 
in the course of which I shall comment on the specific 
items in your letter. Through this answer and 
through the hearings of the personnel security board, 
which I hereby request, I hope to provide a fair basis 
upon which the questions posed by your letter may be 
resolved. 
Robert had asked Lloyd Garrison of the New 
York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton 
and Garrison to serve as his counsel. Lloyd 
Garrison had Herbert Marks, former AEC 
general counsel, as associate. Garrison was as- 
sisted by several of his colleagues, especially 
Samuel Silverman who conducted much of the 
examination of witnesses. AEC appointed a 
hearing board consisting of Gordon Gray, presi- 
dent of the University of North Carolina and 
former Secretary of the Army, as chairman; Ward 
Evans, professor emeritus of chemistry at Loyola 
University in Chicago; and Thomas Morgan, 
chairman of the Board of the Sperry Corporation. 
The AEC decided to get a lawyer from outside 
AEC and settled on Roger Robb, an experienced 
and successful Washington trial lawyer. 
The Board convened in early April, 1954, and 
spent a week reviewing the files and material 
which had been prepared for it. The hearings 
actually started on April 12. Lloyd Garrison and 
his associates had elected not to be cleared for 
classified information but just prior to the actual 
hearings had requested clearance in order to be 
able to be present if classified information should 
be introduced. This clearance was not obtained 
before the conclusion of the hearings. According 
to Lloyd Garrison's comments on the hearings 
much later, this absence of clearance for restricted 
data was not really a serious matter. 
What was a serious matter, and what witnesses 
called to testify in Robert Oppenheimer's behalf 
were shocked to discover, was the adversary 
nature of the proceedings in contrast to a 
"hearing." Roger Robb was an experienced trial 
lawyer and he proceeded in this fashion. Lloyd 
Garrison and his associates were careful not to 
discuss the nature of the hearings with new wit- 
nesses and a good many of them were surprised 
to find the extent to which the AEC attorney acted 
like a prosecutor. Witnesses discovered that in- 
formation about which they were questioned was 
often not available to Robert Oppenheimer's 
counsel or to him. This was not because it in- 
volved AEC-restricted data but because allega- 
tions reported by the FBI were involved and were 
therefore not available. Such information would 
not have been available even if Garrison and his 
associates had been cleared. They were thus put 
in the position of having to disprove charges with- 
out being able to know and assess the full allega- 
tions on which these charges were based. It is 
often very difficult in a security case to get the full 
story growing out of some allegation, and indeed 
this is one of the principal reasons why early 
security cases for AEC were often sent back more 
than once to get a more complete investigation. 
The hearings were confidential nd each witness 
was cautioned by the Board chairman accordingly.. 
Of the hearings themselves remarkably little was 
known publicly until they were released by the 
Commission. This came about because a summary 
of the hearings had been lost and it was feared 
that it had fallen into hands that would make it 
public. Subsequently, it was found, but steps had 
been started to release the complete transcript 
(without some passages judged unwise to release 
because of their relation to classified information) 
and these steps were not stopped. 
The list of witnesses who testified favorably 
for Robert Oppenheimer included ten members or 
former members of the GAC, several members of 
the high command of the Office of Scientific Re- 
search and Development, five former AEC com- 
missioners including two former chairmen, three 
former chairmen of the Research and Development 
Board of the Department of Defense, General 
Leslie Groves, John McCloy (Assistant Secretary 
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of War during much of the war), and many col- 
leagues who had worked with Oppenheimer on 
various studies and committees. There were 
some, including colleagues who had worked with 
him in various capacities, who testified unfavor- 
ably., 
Robert Oppenheimer testified at great length 
and admitted that the story which he had be- 
latedly reported about the Chevalier incident was 
not true. He acknowledged that his initial ac- 
count to security officers had been a fabrication 
and that he had been an "idiot" not to have given 
a straightforward account promptly. To Robert's 
many friends this was a sad incident and not to be 
excused but it hardly warranted the severe 
charges made as being generally true. As one 
witness, Hartley Rowe, said: "I think a man of 
Dr. Oppenheimer's character is not going to make 
the same mistake twice. I would say that he was 
all the more trustworthy for the mistakes he 
made." 
The hearings concluded on May 6, 1954, and 
toward the end of the month the Board presented 
its recommendations to the AEC general manager. 
It was a split vote, with Dr. Evans dissenting, 
recommending that Robert Oppenheimer's clear- 
ance not be reinstated. On the question of loyalty 
all members concurred that ". . . he is a loyal 
citizen." The Board acknowledged the importance 
of its task noting that ". . . in a very real sense 
this case puts the security system of the United 
States on trial, both as to its procedures and as to 
substance." 
In his minority report, Dr. Evans pointed out 
that most of the derogatory information which 
had been presented had been in the hands of the 
Commission when he had been cleared in 1947. 
He felt that Oppenheimer was now being investi- 
gated again for "practically the same derogatory 
information." The majority found his conduct 
in the hydrogen bomb program disturbing. Dr. 
Evans stated, "He did not hinder the development 
of the H-bomb and there is absolutely nothing in 
the testimony to show that he did." 
In mid-June AEC General Manager Kenneth 
Nichols forwarded his recommendations to the 
Commission, based on the hearings and the con- 
clusions of the Personnel Security Board. He 
concurred with Gordon Gray and Thomas Morgan 
that Robert Oppenheimer's clearance should not 
be reinstated. In so doing he put special emphasis 
on the Chevalier incident. He also stated that 
there had been no intention on his part or that of 
the Board to draw in question any honest opinion 
expressed by Oppenheimer on the H-bomb. It is 
not easy to square this view with the statement 
of the original charges or the positions of several 
witnesses who testified adversely on Oppen- 
heimer's views. Finally, the general manager 
stated that Oppenheimer's services had been 
utilized on only three occasions since he left the 
GAC and that it was unlikely that ". . . the AEC, 
even if the question of his security clearance had 
not arisen, would have utilized his services to a 
markedly greater extent in the next few years." 
No mention was made of the Board's finding 
with which all members agreed, that Robert 
Oppenheimer was a loyal citizen. 
The case next came before the Atomic Energy 
Commission. The commissioners had before them 
all of the material already considered including the 
transcript of the hearings, the findings and rec- 
ommendations of the Personnel Security Board, 
the briefs of Oppenheimer's counsel and the rec- 
ommendation of the general manager as well as the 
FBI files. The commissioners gave a decision on 
June 29, 1954, one day before Robert Oppen- 
heimer's consultant contract with AEC expired. 
Four commissioners, Strauss, Campbell, Murray 
and Zuckert, voted to deny clearance for access 
to restricted ata, and Commissioner Smyth voted 
to reinstate clearance. 
Commissioners Strauss, Zuckert, and Campbell 
prepared a majority statement which emphasized 
the Chevalier incident and Oppenheimer's associa- 
tions dating back to before the war. Comments 
on the charge about his opinions on the H-bomb 
were not included except for an incident involving 
a missing letter from Glenn Seaborg. No state- 
ment was made about his loyalty or the conclusions 
of the Gray Board that he was a loyal citizen. It 
was noted at the start, however, that "The Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 lays upon the Commissioners 
the duty to reach a determination as to 'character, 
associations and loyalty' of the individuals en- 
gaged in the work of the Commission." Com- 
missioner Zuckert submitted an additional con- 
curring opinion and Commissioner Murray sub- 
mitted a separate opinion stating his reasons for 
voting that clearance should be denied. 
Commissioner Smyth submitted a dissenting 
opinion, reviewing the principal incidents and 
points that had been raised in the majority 
opinion. Hs conclusions were quite opposite. He 
wrote: 
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Character and associations are important only in- 
sofar as they bear on the possibility that secret infor- 
mation will be improperly revealed. In my opinion 
the most important evidence in this regard is the 
fact that there is no indication in the entire record 
that Dr. Oppenheimer has ever divulged any secret 
information. The past 15 years of his life have been 
investigated and reinvestigated. For much of the 
last 11 years he has been under actual surveillance, 
his movements watched, his conversations noted, his 
mail and telephone calls checked. This professional 
review of his actions has been supplemented by 
enthusiastic amateur help from powerful personal 
enemies. 
On the H-bomb which he considered to be the 
subject of the most important allegations of the 
general manager's letter, Commissioner Smyth 
said that he was ". ., not surprised to find that 
the evidence does not support these allegations in 
any way." He concludes that "Dr. Oppenheimer's 
employment will not endanger the common de- 
fense and security and will be clearly consistent 
with the interests of national security. I prefer 
the positive statement that Dr. Oppenheimer's 
further employment will continue to strengthen 
the United States." 
This decision marked the end of Robert Op- 
penheimer's work as an adviser to the government 
and any participation in or access to classified 
work. After having contributed so much during 
the war as director of Los Alamos and so much 
after the war in many different capacities, his 
contribution was now completely ended. Robert 
was deeply wounded and hurt but much less bitter 
than almost anyone else would have been. 
Scientists in all the western world rallied to his 
support and continued to support him for the re- 
mainder of his life. 
Everywhere people inquired, "How could this 
happen in the United States?" Some were in- 
clined to blame those who opposed his views about 
the H-bomb, but in fact these charges had been 
excluded both by the Board and by the Com- 
mission. Others were inclined to blame those 
who had become Robert's enemies for one reason 
or another, often because his lucid mind some- 
times gave expression in a very sharp tongue. 
Still others blamed the whole climate of the Mc- 
Carthy era which unfortunately was just at its 
peak in the spring of 1954. No one of these can 
be singled out as a principal reason for what 
happened but it is probably fair to say that, if the 
country had not been paralyzed by the witch hunts 
and the fear of communists, none of the other 
factors would have been sufficient to make things 
come out the way they did. In a sense Robert 
Oppenheimer was an unfortunate victim of the 
national paroxysm of this witch hunt. 
The Gray Board had remarked when it started 
its hearings that Robert Oppenheimer's case put 
the security system on trial. One can only con- 
clude that the security system did not stand the 
test. The result was a gross miscarriage of justice 
for a man who had made some of the greatest 
contributions to our country and who was one of 
the world's intellectual leaders. It would be hard 
to maintain that the case was conducted as stated 
by AEC procedures: 
The facts of each case must be carefully weighed 
and determination made in the light of all the informa- 
tion presented, whether favorable or unfavorable. 
The judgment of responsible persons as to the in- 
tegrity of the individuals hould be considered. The 
decision as to security clearance is an overall, com- 
mon sense judgment, made after consideration of all 
of the relevant information as to whether or not 
there is risk that the granting of security clearance 
would endanger the common defense or security. 
The security system of AEC was not set up for 
the prosecutor-type tactics that were used in the 
hearings. Probably the only place for such 
tactics is in an open court of law. Perhaps nothing 
could have been done by Oppenheimer's counsel 
to avoid entrapment of Oppenheimer and other 
witnesses whose memories of details of events 
twelve years or more past were not as reliable as 
written records or transcriptions. Perhaps, as 
Joseph Volpe had recommended, a tough criminal 
lawyer was needed by Robert's counsel to counter 
such tactics. 
To conduct such hearings in private and to have 
the information available to the Board not more 
fully available to counsel for the defendant, made 
it almost impossible to achieve a fair conclusion 
at the height of a period of national apathy and a 
period of fear of the use of innuendo and smear 
by parts of our government. The nature of 
security for classified information makes it dif- 
ficult to conduct hearings openly. While no in- 
formation can be kept secret indefinitely and while 
much is classified that need not be, still there is 
and there will in the future be need for closely 
guarded national secrets. It is very doubtful that 
we have a security system that can provide fair 
hearings and decisions for an individual who is 
brought up at a time such as the spring of 1954. 
It is not clear whether at that time Robert Oppen- 
heimer might not have been better off before the 
McCarthy committee or the Jenner committee. 
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At least what came out would have been currently 
subjected to public scrutiny and might have 
helped to bring our nation to its senses somewhat 
sooner. 
Robert Oppenheimer returned to his work as 
director of the Institute for Advanced Study in 
Princeton. The liveliness and intensity which 
had characterized his activities before were gone. 
He was greatly changed. In recent years so much 
of his effort had been devoted to his advisory 
activities and his interests in international co- 
operation that he had not personally been really 
active in particle-physics research. Now he lacked 
the strength and perhaps the interest to throw 
himself completely into this work. He felt, 
probably rightly, that intense participation was 
for younger men. The Institute under his 
directorship had become the leading center for 
theoretical physics. He had a distinguished senior 
staff with Dyson, Pais, Placzek, Lee, and Yang, 
in addition to Einstein and von Neumann, who 
had been there for many years. The large school 
of postdoctoral fellows which he had developed 
was in full bloom and not only did he continue 
to encourage them but his remarkable ability to 
stimulate young physicists was an important part 
of its success. Princeton was a center of intense 
activity and much of it was due to Robert's 
stimulating leadership of discussions and seminars. 
His clarity, insight, and capability for summation 
of the most complicated and difficult situations 
always played an important role whenever he was 
present. He was always in demand as a dis- 
cussion leader or summary speaker for the im- 
portant international meetings which had really 
grown up from small conferences that he had 
started after the war. 
For many years Robert Oppenheimer had been 
in great demand as a speaker. He had talked to 
widely different audiences on subjects which in- 
cluded "The Scientist in Society," "The En- 
couragement of Science," "Physics in a Contem- 
porary World," "Atomic Weapons and American 
Policy," and "Atomic Energy as a Contemporary 
Problem." In 1955 he collected these and 
published them under the title of another of the 
talks, "The Open Mind," in which he pointed out 
the need in a democracy for information if the 
citizens are to arrive at sensible conclusions. 
These talks were all cogent and beautifully pre- 
sented. After 1954 his interests turned more 
toward the relationship of science to other sub- 
jects including the arts, and its development and 
impact on our society. In late 1953 he had de- 
livered the Reith Lectures over the home service 
of the British Broadcasting Corporation and these 
were published in 1954 with some added notes and 
appendices. These six lectures covered parts of 
science from Newton to the present, the relation- 
ship of the sciences and a concluding talk on 
"Science and Man's Community." They carried 
the appropriate title "Science and the Common 
Understanding." These lectures were typically 
Robert Oppenheimer in their breadth of vision, 
depth of understanding, and beauty of expression. 
In succeeding years Robert gave many talks 
principally on subjects covered in his Reith 
Lectures and especially on some of the fundamental 
dilemmas of physics but including many other 
topics as well. Three of these given at McMaster 
University in 1962 were published under the 
title "The Flying Trapeze: Three Crises for 
Physicists." There were a great many lectures 
given in the late fifties and early sixties which 
were not published. Many of these were given 
at universities where students, faculty, and others 
gave him standing ovations. In addition, he ap- 
peared in a long television interview with Edward 
R. Murrow which attracted wide attention and 
showed clearly his reflective mood in these years. 
Wherever he went he was recognized and it was 
impossible for him to travel in this country or in 
Europe without strangers coming up to greet him 
and wish him well. 
In 1960 the International Atomic Energy 
Agency of which Sterling Cole, formerly a mem- 
ber of the Joint Congressional Committee on 
Atomic Energy, was director general, appointed 
Robert Oppenheimer representative to an inter- 
national conference. In 1961, after Kennedy 
became President, he began to be accepted a little 
by Washington. There was greater sympathy 
and appreciation from some of the President's 
close advisers. He visited Latin America to 
lecture under the sponsorship of the Organization 
of American States. His visit and his lectures 
attracted great attention and enthusiastic omment. 
He was invited to attend a dinner at the White 
House for Nobel Laureates as a special guest. 
In the spring of 1963, Chairman Glenn Seaborg 
told him that the AEC was awarding the Fermi 
Prize to him. Although announced earlier the 
formal award by the President was scheduled for 
December 2, the anniversary of the first self- 
sustaining chain reaction. The President's 
assassination in Dallas threw all plans into doubt 
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and confusion, including these. But President 
Johnson decided that the award ceremony would 
go ahead at the White House as planned. Robert 
was deeply moved. It was a recognition long 
deserved but to which there was still strong op- 
position. In his reply, Robert said "I think it 
is just possible, Mr. President, that it has taken 
some charity and some courage for you to make 
this award today." 
The late fifties and early sixties were difficult 
ones too for his wife and children. The hearings 
had been an ordeal for them, especially for Kitty, 
who was present with him most of the time. It 
was hard for the children who could not under- 
stand what it was all about except that everything 
seemed unfair. The hearings meant that they 
were separated from their parents for much of the 
spring. Later Kitty was plagued by recurrent 
illness which bothered her for many years. Robert 
acquired a place on the ocean in the Virgin Islands 
and the whole family spent much of the early 
summer there as well as shorter periods during 
the year. It was a welcome respite from a busy 
life and so much publicity, and it gave an op- 
portunity for the family to be close together again. 
Robert's health had never been really good and 
for many years he seemed to live on nervous 
energy. This now deserted him and he became 
increasingly frail. He had for many years been 
subject to a severe rasping cough. In early 1966 
it was discovered that he had throat cancer. There 
was an operation and extended radiation treat- 
ments. For a time, Robert could still travel 
around but he resigned as director and became 
senior professor at the Institute. Before long 
there was recurrence of his disease and it became 
clear that the end was not far off. Though weak, 
he kept his clarity of mind and, as much as his 
strength would bear, he enjoyed seeing friends 
and remembering earlier and more pleasant times. 
The end came on Saturday, February 18, 1967. 
A memorial service was held in Princeton on 
February 25. Hans Bethe, Henry Smyth, and 
George Kennan gave moving summaries of Robert 
Oppenheimer's career as they knew him and his 
many accomplishments. A memorial session of 
the American Physical Society was held at the 
spring meeting in Washington at which Serber, 
Weisskopf, Pais, and Seaborg spoke of the various 
phases of Robert Oppenheimer's very productive 
career. All spoke of the feeling which they all 
shared of how exciting it had been to work with 
him. Rabi, who was unable to be present and who 
had known him since the early days in Germany, 
wrote a penetrating and glowing introduction to 
the published accounts. 
Abraham Pais, his close colleague at the Insti- 
tute in Princeton said: 
Any single one of the following contributions would 
have marked Oppenheimer out as a pre-eminent 
scientist: his own research work in physics; his 
influence as a teacher; his leadership at Los Alamos; 
the growth of the Institute for Advanced Study as a 
leading center of theoretical physics under his 
directorship; and his efforts to promote a more com- 
mon understanding ofscience. When all is combined 
we honor Oppenheimer as a great leader of science. 
When all is interwoven with the dramatic events that 
centered around him we remember Oppenheimer as 
one of the most remarkable personalities of this 
century. 
Robert Oppenheimer's thoughts on science and 
its relation to man and society are shown in the 
concluding remarks of his Reith Lectures: 
We know that our work is rightly both an instru- 
ment and an end. A great discovery is a thing of 
beauty; and our faith-our binding, quiet faith-is 
that knowledge is good and good in itself. It is also 
an instrument; itis an instrument for our successors, 
who will use it to probe elsewhere and more deeply; 
it is an instrument for technology, for the practical 
arts, and for man's affairs. So it is with us as 
scientists; so it is with us as men. We are at once 
instrument and end, discoverers and teachers, actors 
and observers. We understand, as we hope others 
understand, that in this there is a harmony between 
knowledge in the sense of science, that specialized 
and general knowledge, which it is our purpose to 
uncover, and the community of man. We, like all 
men, are among those who bring a little light to the 
vast unending darkness of man's life and world. For 
us as for all men, change and eternity, specialization 
and unity, instrument and final purpose, community 
and individual man alone, complementary each to the 
other, both require and define our bonds and our 
freedom. 
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